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ABSTRACT
Industrial districts in the Brazilian automotive industry have 
facilitated just-in-time production, functional flexibility and 
compatibility of HR practices since the 1980s. However, this 
model has been threatened by global over-capacity and the 
rise of low-cost suppliers in South Korea and China. This paper 
develops literature on proximity dynamics though exploring 
the influence of global supply chains on HRM in industrial 
districts. The more specific research questions are: How 
viable are industrial districts in the context of global crises? 
And how is this viability bound up with the awareness of HR 
practices down the supply chain? The findings indicate that 
the industrial districts model is under threat. In the context 
of global supply chains, automotive majors have shifted costs 
onto their suppliers, disrupting established relationships, and 
moreover, they often lack knowledge of the employment 
practices of distant suppliers. Yet, in times of political and 
economic uncertainty, worker rights might be best served by 
geographical and cognitive proximity.
Whilst the automotive industry has always been a global one, from the 1980s to 
the early 2000s the automotive majors moved towards leaner workforces, with a 
greater reliance on a closely integrated network of suppliers in close spatial prox-
imity to major car plants. This enabled them to closely monitor quality, whilst 
simplifying employment relations, facilitating numerical flexibility and reducing 
direct labour costs, as well as Just-in-Time manufacturing. Local industrial clusters 
made for complementarities, a high degree of functional flexibility, and compati-
bility in human resource (HR) policies and practices.
The geographical concentration of competitors or firms operating in the 
same sector can be referred to as an industrial cluster, while industrial districts 
share similar characteristics but have a ‘higher concentration of similar firms’ 
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(Belussi & Sammarra, 2010, p. i). Moreover, in the industrial districts literature, 
there tends to be a greater focus on the social relations underpinning and recon-
stituting firm networks (Vom Hofe & Chen, 2006). Given the long-established 
social networks linking generations of workers with spatially concentrated spheres 
of production – and the relationships between managers in firms encompassed 
by this study, the term ‘industrial district’ is more appropriate in this instance. 
However, many of the findings are relevant to the wider literature on industrial 
clusters, especially since the primary focus of this particular study is less on the 
effects of such personal networks and more on the shifting interrelationship 
between key firms as actors in their own right, and the associated consequences for 
human resource management. As Hervas-Oliver, Gonzalez, Caja, and Sempere-
Ripoll (2015) note, the literature on industrial districts is quite heterogeneous and 
rooted in different disciplinary traditions, and this accounts for the very uneven 
attention accorded to HR issues.
In practice, few industrial districts adhere to an ideal type. Rather, they rep-
resent systems in flux (Paniccia, 1998). Moreover, relationships between firms, 
and with workers, may not always be characterized by high trust, but also by 
adversarialism and competition. Indeed, it could be argued that some players 
in industrial districts are in a much weaker position – and hence, more prone 
to internal disruption – than others (Rabellotti & Schmitz, 1999). The level of 
competence can also vary. As Pinch, Henry, Jenkins, and Tallman (2003) found, 
within industrial districts, knowledge may be concentrated at particular levels.
Local industrial clusters and districts attract multinationals in the first place 
owing to the advantages that they confer, including the absorption of new knowl-
edge and capabilities, and the securing of cost production of standardized compo-
nents, in a process characterized as exploitative offshoring. However, offshoring 
has become more explorative over time, as dominant firms seek to shift more 
knowledge intensive activities to lower cost countries (Belussi & Sedita, 2010). 
In coping with, and drawing from the knowledge flows that come from insertion 
in global value chains, local industrial districts may thus develop new activities 
and enhance their capabilities to secure their status and relevance (Belussi & De 
Propris, 2013).
The automotive industrial clusters model – even in the case of those that con-
stitute full fledged industrial districts – has come under intense threat in recent 
years due to two developments. The first is a global over-capacity in the auto-
motive industry. The second is through the entrance and rise of ultra-low cost 
suppliers of basic constituent components in South Korea, and, above all, China, 
albeit that, in the case of the latter, much value is captured by gateway intermedi-
aries, rather than producers of low-cost basic components themselves (Dedrick, 
Kraemer, & Linden, 2009). This has disrupted dense clusters of established rela-
tions within local supplier networks, and made the monitoring of supplier quality 
and labour standards more difficult. As a result, the key aim of this paper is to 
develop the literature on proximity dynamics through assessing the influence of 
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global supply chains on HRM in industrial districts. The more specific research 
questions are: How viable are industrial districts in the context of global supply 
chains? And how is this viability bound up with the awareness of HR practices 
down the supply chain? The Brazilian automotive industry is used for illustrative 
purposes. In Brazil, the industry is characterized by major car firms and key sup-
pliers co-existing in close proximity; Tier 1 suppliers may be major conglomerates 
in their own right, with activities spanning many sectors. Indeed, Belussi (2015) 
argues that whilst industrial districts are often depicted as self-contained entities, 
they are closely involved in the globalization of production networks, with their 
fortunes closely bound up with the strategies of the multinational as a whole. 
The developmental outcomes of industrial districts also depend on the relative 
position of local firms within global value chains (Belussi & Sammarra, 2010), 
since global value chains connect industrial districts with external agents (Oliver, 
Garrigós, & Porta, 2008), and firms need to use the international fragmentation 
of production to secure both sustainability and upgrading (Belussi & Sammarra, 
2010). As Oliver et al. (2008) argue, the viability of industrial districts also relies 
on the nature and extent of external ties, an issue that is often neglected within 
the industrial districts literature.
Industrial districts and proximity
The classic Marshallian model defines industrial districts as areas that are char-
acterized by a sectoral and spatial focus, close relations between firms, and a link 
between production and social life, with a strong notion of communitarian iden-
tity. However, intense global competition and less closely knit local coherence have 
arguably undermined this model. In the Italian context, for example, successful 
players looked externally, and as suppliers were sought from further afield, local 
relationships became significantly less close. In other words, inter district supplier 
relationships undermined intra district ones (De Marchi & Grandinetti, 2014). 
Similarly, in looking at Spain, Pla-Barber and Puig (2009) found that industrial 
districts faced threats from two directions. Closer integration in the global econ-
omy diluted the advantages of spatial proximity, while competition was intensified 
as a result of global sourcing. Against these trends, arguably the only durable 
counterweights are structural barriers to the mobility of labour, and, as recent 
institutional theory alerts us, the embedded and group specific nature of developed 
cognitive capabilities (Aoki, 2010). Thus, the industrial districts most capable of 
dealing with external shocks from abroad are the ones that are most capable of 
innovating, building on internally developed relational capital, and absorbing 
new capabilities from abroad (Molina-Morales & Martinez-Fernandez, 2006).
The type of supply chain, and proximity to other firms, might also influence 
the nature of interaction within supply chains. Through imitation and interaction, 
firms located in industrial districts develop adaptive capabilities. However, whilst 
all supply chains are distinct in how they combine learning and adaption, the 
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complexity of the products produced and environmental turbulence moderate 
the effects of this distinctiveness (Giannoccaro, 2015). In turn, adaption rep-
resents the product of coordination strategies that promote both flexibility and 
coherence; adaptive supply chains are characterized by closed loop systems that 
are both dynamic and allow for feedback (Surana, Kumara, Greaves, & Raghavan, 
2005). The French Proximity approach, moreover, suggests that the closer inter-
actions and better communication that comes with spatial proximity equips firms 
better to cope with structural uncertainty (Bouba-Olga, Carrincazeaux, Coris, 
& Ferru, 2015). Proximity allows for the better use and dissemination of local 
implicit knowledge and more closely integrated systems; hence, the contraction 
and integration of supply chains may ultimately allow for advantages and effi-
ciencies that outweigh the benefits of cost efficiency and specialization that may 
come with greater distance (Hameri & Paatela, 2005). Bouba-Olga et al. (2015) 
argue that the jury is still out on the matter, but suggest that it is specialization 
rather than cost that might allow more distant players to outcompete firms in 
closer proximity. At the same time, local creativity may help to reinforce district 
competitiveness against threats from abroad (Bellandi, 1996). Hence, the French 
Proximity approach links geographical proximity with proximity in terms of insti-
tution, regulation, embedded knowledge and capabilities. The latter are not easily 
replicable, but may provide the ultimate foundation of competitiveness in the face 
of a rapidly changing external environment.
The persistence of industrial districts is also bound up with the practice of 
HRM. Broadly compatible HR policies within and between organizations in a 
district may support the development and husband local capabilities within the 
firm; at the same time, such developed capabilities may be insufficient to withstand 
competition from goods produced by ultra-low cost labour. Relative resilience, in 
turn, will not only reflect the relative nature of this cost advantage, but also internal 
proximity dynamics. Close spatial proximity in industrial districts facilitates not 
only the development and circulation of a pool of skilled labour, but also a greater 
compatibility in HR policies and practice (c.f. Humphrey & Schmitz, 1996). This 
compatibility facilitates both ease in contracting and the optimal use of local skills 
(Crouch & Le Galès, 2004). Hence, key firms are likely to be closely and intimately 
aware of how their spatially near partner firms manage their people; inevitably, 
in the case of more remote suppliers, such knowledge is likely to be more limited.
Changes in the global automotive industry
The automotive industry was synonymous with the Fordist production paradigm, 
characterized by repetitive but well paid work up until the 1970s. Since then, 
Fordism has been replaced by more flexible production methods, and a shift of 
production from vertically integrated large car plants to more federalized produc-
tion arrangements, involving first-tier suppliers to a much greater extent (Frigant, 
2009). Although this has meant that present-day automotive plants have much 
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leaner staffing, this has gone hand in hand with well paid and rewarding work, 
with relatively high degrees of responsible autonomy (Benders & Van Hootegem, 
1999), often carried over to first-tier suppliers. At the same time, first-tier suppliers 
have developed more intricate and closely interconnected supply chain relations 
in their own right; this has enabled leaner staffing, greater flexibility and better 
sharing of risk (Frigant, 2009).
The location of suppliers geographically near to the motor manufacturing or 
assembly plant is, in part, a function of this shift, where the manufacturing plant 
holds almost no stock of parts and relies on their original equipment manufac-
turer (OEM) suppliers to deliver the right components direct to the production 
line at precisely the right time. However, there is a trade-off between the risk 
reduction strategy of dual (or multiple) sourcing, and the simplicity and cost 
reduction accruing from single sourcing (Xanthopoulos, Vlachos, & Iakovou, 
2012). Moreover, an over-reliance on a single supplier can leave the firm exposed 
in the event of a quality failure (Wagner & Bode, 2006, p. 301); this means that 
the debate around single and multiple sourcing was never closed, especially in 
terms of basic components that do not require much proprietary knowledge. On 
the one hand, the automotive industry in Brazil has moved towards much closer 
integration with Tier 1 suppliers. On the other hand, the findings of this study 
reveal that this has also been associated with the unwinding of relations further 
down supply chains.
Industrial districts and the Brazilian automotive sector
The automotive industry in Brazil has internationalized and become more tech-
nologically advanced over time. Up until the 1950s, Brazil relied on imported 
cars, although some companies used a system called ‘completely knocked down’, 
constructing cars using imported parts. Government incentives during the 1950s 
were intended to lead to import substitution; following this, and up until the 1980s, 
there was a movement towards semi knocked down production, entailing the use 
of some Brazilian made automotive parts such as springs, wheel hubs, batteries 
and tyres, and providing a major impetus for the development of a local compo-
nents industry, including many multinational components firms. Gradually, the 
automotive industry moved towards local production of all components within 
the supply chain. Until the 1970s, the automotive sector was oriented towards 
supplying national demand. However, the government’s ‘Biefex’ plan encouraged 
further integration into international markets. By 1980, more than a million cars 
were exported per year (Scavarda & Hamacher, 2001).
By the 1990s, the Brazilian automotive industry had gradually moved towards 
a higher proportion of locally sourced skills, more advanced production systems, 
and diversification of supply chains for different products (Scavarda & Hamacher, 
2001). However, in the 1990s, economic stagnation in Brazil led to a fall in local 
demand and foreign investment; Japanese manufacturers invested in Europe 
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and the United States, rather than in Brazil. A serious crisis of competitiveness 
forced closer cooperation between local players, leading to more closely inte-
grated industrial districts (Meyer-Stamer, 1998). The government initially stuck 
by a local content requirement of 60% (Humphrey, 2003), but ameliorated the 
costs through incentives for new investments at the state and municipal level, and 
reduced taxes for some internally produced vehicles. This increased local demand 
(Scavarda & Hamacher, 2001). Backtracking somewhat, from 1996 to 2000 the 
government also allowed the import of automotive components at lower rates 
(Humphrey, 2003). This was associated with around US$10bn being invested in 
Brazil in autoparts and $15bn in car manufacturing, leading to new entrants, new 
plants, and diversification of products (Humphrey, 2003; Scavarda & Hamacher, 
2001). During the 2000s, the government introduced various incentives for local 
context and investment (Pascoal, Candido, Ugo, Delamaro, & Tsukada, 2014) and 
regional employer federations, under the umbrella of the National Confederation 
of Industry, took a more proactive role in the development of state policies and 
support services (CNI, 2015). However, the automotive majors faced renewed 
difficulties of overcapacity, and in 2014, companies were operating at only 50% 
capacity (Barros, 2015), in part due to cheap imports from China and South 
Korea. The Brazilian Ministry of Labour estimated that around 38,700 jobs were 
lost in sectors linked to the automotive industry in the first six months of 2015 
(Versiani, 2015).
In terms of the development of industrial districts, historically, whether sup-
pliers or automotive majors, Brazilian automotive firms were highly vertically 
integrated and imported a high number of auto parts, owing to shortfalls in 
local supplier capabilities, and dominant strategies of internalizing production 
wherever possible (Meyer-Stamer, 1998). In line with common global practice, 
in the 1990s Brazilian automotive majors worked closely with a network of 
suppliers within industrial districts (condominiums) (Humphrey & Salerno, 
1999). Subsequently, some first-tier suppliers became responsible for assem-
bling automotive parts, and this was developed further, when modular con-
sortia were developed by companies such as Volkswagen. Since the supplier 
was responsible for assembling the module on the manufacturer’s assembly 
line, this implied closer and longer term relationships (Collins, Bechler, & 
Pires, 1997). However, new industrial districts were often not very well con-
ceived or constructed and followed out-of-date urban standards (Humphrey & 
Schmitz, 1996; Mevin, 2014). Moreover, there was often insufficient planning 
for future growth, leaving little room for the construction of new factories or 
the extension of old ones (Mevin, 2014). Sustainable industrial districts also 
depended on a complex web of institutional arrangements and associated 
social relations, interlinking national and local government, educational and 
training institutions, employer federations and the labour movement, and 
other local actors. However, as an emerging market, institutional arrangements 
in Brazil remained less closely coupled than they would typically be in more 
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mature institutional contexts (c.f. Cooke, Wood, & Horwitz, 2015; Crouch & 
Le Galès, 2004).
Research methods
The findings reported here are from case study research within foreign-owned 
automotive subsidiaries, consisting of five OEMs, five first-tier suppliers, one 
second-tier supplier and representatives from the broader institutional con-
text. The findings are part of a larger project that examined automotive and 
textiles companies within South Africa and Brazil. The data reported here are 
from 30 in-depth interviews carried out in 2014 with CEOs, accountants, HR 
managers, supply chain managers and production managers within companies 
as well as the CEO of a national employer federation, manager of a regional 
employer federation and a regional development bank. Details of participants 
are provided in Table 1. The interviews varied in length, but ranged from half 
an hour to over two hours. The topics covered in the interviews with auto-
motive firms included: background information on the region, company and 
interviewee; information on their supply chains (customers, direct suppliers 
and second-tier suppliers and beyond) and the nature of their relationships 
with them; HR practices and accounting practices; and awareness of the HR 
practices within their suppliers. In addition, we used both predetermined and 
spontaneous prompts and probes. When negotiating access to automotive 
firms, we explained that we wished to interview available participants within 
HR, accounting and finance, supply chain management and purchasing. We 
used semi-structured interviews, and the broad themes indicated above were 
covered in each interview. Due to the concentration of firms in certain areas, 
we focused on three main cities in Brazil, and their environs: Recife, Sao Paulo 
and Curitiba. Each of the industrial districts had been in operation for over 
25 years, and in each district, there were concentrated and specialized local 
areas with the co-location of car assemblers and suppliers. The suppliers were 
not, in any of these cases, working exclusively for one car manufacturer. Given 
the limited number of OEMs in Brazil and the need to preserve anonymity, 
the region for each firm is not indicated in this paper.
All interview transcripts were fully transcribed, and many were translated from 
Portuguese then checked by members of the research team. Analysis of qualitative 
data was undertaken using NVivo. A hierarchical coding frame was developed by 
the study’s Principal Investigator, in consultation with two other members of the 
research team and through reference to the literature. The coding frame included 
a small number of overall themes (which broadly followed the themes outlined 
above), and various levels of sub-themes. Following input of fully transcribed data, 
coding took place using open coding and then the constant comparative method 
in order to refine and merge categories (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
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Findings
The findings cover two main areas: the nature of localized supply networks in the 
Brazilian automotive industry and awareness of HR practices down the supply 
chain.
Localized supply networks in the Brazilian motor industry
In the 1980s, the automotive industry kept high levels of stocks to sustain opera-
tions due to high logistics costs and the need to provide a cushion in the event of 
plant failure or other disruption. Technological advances made automotive plants 
more reliable (Michalos, Makris, Papakostas, Mourtzis, & Chryssolouris, 2010; 
Nepal et al., 2007). Moreover, spatial proximity of, and close coordination with, 
suppliers had helped to keep logistics costs as low as possible. Just-in-Time man-
ufacturing led to dramatic stock-level reductions for the manufacturers, although 
it shifted the supply responsibility to the OEMs.
Table 1. case study companies and research participants.
Case study code
oeM/first-tier 
supplier
Car/ 
motorbike
Participant 
code Participant job role
Brautoa oem car scm1 supply chain director
scm2 supply chain director
scm3 supply chain director
mgr1 Production manager
BrautoB oem car acct1 accountant/finance (Director)
acct2 accountant/finance (Director)
scm1 supply chain director
Brautoc oem car acct1 senior accountant
acct2 senior accountant
hr1 hr director
BrautoD second-tier 
supplier
car ceo1 ceo
acct1 senior accountant
Brautoe first-tier supplier car ceo1 Director
hr1 hr director
Pm1 Production manager
Brautof first-tier supplier motorbike acct1 accountant/finance director
hr1 hr director
Brautog first-tier supplier car scm1 Quality manager-supply 
chains
acct1 accountant/finance director
Brautoh first-tier supplier car hr1 hr director
scm1 logistics manager
BrautoI first-tier supplier car ceo1 general manager
BrautoJ first-tier supplier motorbike hr1 hr director
mrkt marketing director
acct1 accountant/finance director
acct2 accountant/finance director
scm1 supply chain/quality director
employer org1 employer federa-
tion – national
n/a ceo1 Director of employer feder-
ation
employer org2 employer federa-
tion – regional
n/a mgr1 manager of employer 
federation
Development Bank1 regional develop-
ment bank
n/a mgr1 Planning manager
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In BrAutoI, the ‘just-in-time’ model persisted, but with some diversification. The 
company had a warehouse close to one manufacturer, and delivered some products 
within half a day, while the time was much delayed for another (BrAutoI_gm1). 
BrAutoH also maintained just-in-time production (BrAutoH_scm1). However, 
internationalization had extenuated their supply chain: 
We have long chains. We have suppliers that are from Brazil, that are more of a single 
supply chain, but we have suppliers that are from Asia, that are a little bit further … 
The longest chain is this one from Asia, because we need to make this cross docking in 
Europe, and it is about 51 days … it is a long chain. (BrAutoH_scm1)
In BrAutoA, there had also been changes over recent years: 
We [previously] had a condominium with 18 suppliers…I think there is a tendency 
when you have the same suppliers in the same condominium, there are several com-
mon things that you can share, and reduce the cost. And I think it is easier to exchange 
good practice … In a way it’s like a marriage, you need to have a very good relationship 
for that condominium … because everybody knows that if one supplier goes down, the 
entire condominium would go down. (BrAutoA_mgr1)
Much of the ‘good practice’ centred around ways of organizing work, and asso-
ciated HR practices, with a degree of mutual interdependence. However, these 
networks, and the associated ability to adapt, were increasingly open to disruption. 
Most suppliers were from Brazil, but firms now obtained supplies from North 
America and Europe, and, increasingly, Asia (BrAutoA_scm2; BrAutoA_scm3).
In BrAutoB there was a concern to sustain localized supply chains, and there 
were still suppliers located near the manufacturing site. They had worked with 
some suppliers since the 1980s, implying a large degree of dependency: 
And this is one of our needs and things that we are looking at all the time – to bring 
new suppliers close to us, or even in Brazil that can grow together with us and also 
participate in the total market. (BrAutoB_scm1)
It seems that the industrial districts had persisted, but they were under strain, 
with smaller tier players being driven under, largely through cost reasons, as was 
the case for BrAutoD. This company had around 130 suppliers, and most were 
located near to them. They used local suppliers of autoparts, plastic injectors and 
stamping companies, but also imported from Europe (10% of imported parts) 
and Asia (40%). The imports from Asia included finished parts from China and 
electronics for engines (BrAutoD_ceo1). The CEO explained: 
… we have a strong relationship with our supplier to double up growth and especially 
in Brazil. Three years ago we changed a little bit to this strategy: we produce the same 
kind of product in Asia, in North America and South America … We saw a product in 
Brazil yesterday. [The supplier] quoted for parts at 75% higher than we buy from Korea. 
[This is] paying a lot to localize. We need transportation, tax, all of that, so he’s 75% 
more expensive. That’s critical. (BrAutoD_ceo1)
In some cases, components were imported, and companies within Brazil would put 
the parts together, replacing manufacture with a high degree of local content with 
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assembly work. This was adversely affecting some local suppliers, and impacting 
on HRM: 
We have had a reduction of staff this year for the [OEM1] contract because of a change 
of [OEM1’s] manufacturing requirements. They are importing pure components for 
some of their models, and manufacturing them locally in Brazil instead. Therefore they 
have had lesser requirement for part volumes through our premises. (BrAutoE_ceo1)
In turn, this gradually reduced the need for specific skills sets and capabilities 
locally. There had also been some changes to the localized supply chains in terms 
of outsourcing of logistics (BrAutoA). However, in Brazil, core services were 
not usually outsourced, due to union demands and government requirements 
(BrAutoE_hr1). Another important feature was the role of the parent company. 
In BrAutoC, for example, the parent company acted as a ‘centre of consolidation’, 
purchasing products from suppliers in Thailand, China and Japan then selling 
them to the subsidiary (BrAutoC_acct1).
These interviews reveal that whilst local managers of Tier 1s and automotive 
majors had strong personal and inter-organizational ties – and associated com-
mitment – to local suppliers, HQs tended to be a great deal more dispassionate, 
with decision-making being weighted to a greater extent towards costs, rather 
than towards the advantages of locally accumulated human capabilities. The above 
changes diluted localized supply chains.
Awareness of HR practices down the supply chain
As outlined above, the automotive industry is generally regarded as having good 
HR practices. Perhaps because of this, in most of the companies there was limited 
formal monitoring of the employment practices of suppliers (except for industrial 
action, health and safety, overtime and training) or the keeping of data on this, 
although interviews with managers revealed some informal knowledge of what 
went on within local suppliers. For example, in the OEM BrAutoA, supplier data 
was kept on the size of the workforce, pay, health and safety, training and working 
hours, but not on equal opportunities, leave, compensation for workplace acci-
dents and redundancies (BrAutoA_scm1; BrAutoA_scm2). They did not actively 
monitor labour standards, forced labour, or child labour of suppliers, nor did they 
know if suppliers recognized trade unions (BrAutoA_scm3).
In contrast, OEM BrAutoB evaluated suppliers in order for them to be assessed 
and certified as a global supplier and sought to ensure that local suppliers followed 
legislation (BrAutoB_acct1), although they acknowledged that local suppliers were 
easier to monitor than more distant ones. However, there appeared to be limited 
intention to resolve suppliers’ HR issues: ‘Our involvement is more in relation to 
knowing what’s going on, the consequence of it and how it can affect our produc-
tion …’ (BrAutoB_scm1).
In OEM BrAutoC, it was the purchasing and quality departments that liaised 
directly with suppliers, but their attention was focused on larger companies: 
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Obviously there are carmakers that don’t have such a great level of sophistication. They 
are one step behind, so to speak. But talking about the companies that are ahead of 
the segment, there is a great concern to monitor, to audit, certify, and make sure that 
the product you get is the best possible product. Problems exist? Of course they do. 
All industries do. But the technical base helps to avoid these things. (BrAutoC_acct1)
The company audited suppliers, but focused on quality and safety (BrAutoC_
acct1). The same interviewee added that, ‘the main suppliers are just as big as we 
are. They are global companies too, so I would say that it is hard to come across 
this kind of situation [for example, child labour] in this segment’ (BrAutoC_acct1). 
In BrAutoD a second-tier supplier, 
It’s like this: we stipulate in the contracts that they follow all the rules. But I do not keep 
an eye on it. For example, that level of information that you asked … I don’t inspect 
that. For example, if they employ disabled workers, if they have the right quota, we do 
not monitor that. (BrAutoD_acct1)
The CEO of the same company (BrAutoD) stated that they had a code of conduct 
for child labour, but did not ask suppliers about training, and were not concerned 
with working hours, pay, number of temporary and permanent workers, or equal 
opportunities, although they did ask suppliers about safety. This was, however, 
different for service providers within the company since ‘it’s a huge risk for us, 
because in the court the employees put the company as the first level, in the second 
level us. In the end if the company doesn’t pay, we need to pay’ (BrAutoD_ceo1). 
There was variation among the first-tier suppliers. The CEO of BrAutoE explained 
how as a supplier they were required to be audited by their customer. Yet, when 
asked if they tried to ensure that their suppliers, in turn, followed international 
labour standards, the CEO explained that their main concern was compliance 
with legislation. He added, 
We make sure that we contract only recognised and respected and reliable subcontrac-
tors, so we’re generally aware that they would comply with those standards. However, 
I’m not aware that we here in Brazil have actively audited any of our suppliers, corpo-
rate organisations. (BrAutoE_ceo1)
Similarly, BrAutoH did not appear to monitor suppliers’ HR practices (BrAutoH_
hr1), and in BrAutoI, there was also a lack of auditing or monitoring of suppliers, 
although they expected suppliers to comply with legislation (BrAutoI_gmr1). In 
contrast, BrAutoJ required information from prospective suppliers on their main 
clients and suppliers, and, 
… normally, both here and in the external market [imported products], we visit the 
companies to check their facilities … and if they will be able to supply us … This is the 
standard procedure … Obviously in China this [checking on HR practices of suppliers] 
is a bit more complicated, but we take care to check them carefully. We respect and 
prioritise those who we really notice that their way of supplying and working are close 
to what we have here. (BrAutoJ_scm1)
When asked if there had been any cases when they had stopped working with the 
supplier because of bad employment practices, he replied, 
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From the ones we started with, we changed, at least, ten, either as I remember, due to 
quality problems or because we noticed that they did not have this care … This reflects 
almost directly the product quality and we notice this straight away. (BrAutoJ_scm1)
When asked which countries the suppliers with quality problems were from, he 
replied that they were ‘all over China’. However, he also explained that some man-
ufacturers in China worked with large European factories, 
so their quality standard is the same or better than ours – their quality and labour 
standards. I do not know in terms of payment if it is encouraging. But in terms of the 
way they treat the employees, they are very similar to ours … and there are compa-
nies in China that have product quality superior to the products we can find in Italy. 
(BrAutoJ_scm1)
Relationships with second-tier suppliers and beyond
Following questions about HR practices in their first-tier suppliers, companies 
were also asked about their relationships with second-tier suppliers. A supply 
chain manager in OEM BrAutoA expected first-tier suppliers to take responsi-
bility for this: 
Normally we have our critical suppliers or key suppliers. They produce some complex 
parts [gave examples] and we normally do not contact with them but we have a close 
monitor with our first suppliers. Sometimes in between two or three months we make 
a short or informal survey of their suppliers, if everything is OK with the supply floor. 
Because our focus is to know if they could have any problems about capacity and buff-
ers. So that is the normal process that you have … They [the first tier suppliers] need 
to frequently review the capacity of the second tier. Not with us directly, but they need 
to do that. I’m not sure of the frequency, but they need to do that. (BrAutoA_scm3)
However, it was suggested that they (BrAutoA) did not yet have much to do with 
their third- or fourth-tier suppliers: ‘Raw material suppliers, for instance, don’t 
share information and you have to live with it’ (BrAutoA_scm_1).
OEM BrAutoB reported that they tried to know second tier suppliers, in order 
to be competitive (BrAutoB_scm1), while OEM BrAutoC certified both direct 
suppliers and tier two suppliers. Their financial director explained that a certain 
degree of control of second tier suppliers was important as: 
It will interfere in the quality of the product, you know? If they are … ‘ah, they are per-
fect, but their supplier is shit’ then you will not get good stuff here, there’s no use, so we 
do audit the chain. (BrAutoC_acct1)
The second-tier supplier BrAutoD in contrast, had ‘very little contact’ with their 
own second-tier suppliers (BrAutoD, acct1), and this was also the case for inter-
viewees from the first-tier suppliers BrAutoE and BrAutoH. Indeed, the sup-
ply chain manager from BrAutoH explained that ‘it is not our responsibility’ 
(BrAutoH_scm1). Although the HR manager admitted that their company was 
‘co-responsible’, they admitted that no-one from their company was aware of the 
working conditions of second-tier suppliers (BrAutoH_hr1).
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More generally, it seems that rather than being concerned about working con-
ditions in supplier firms, the overriding imperative was, ‘the capacity of produc-
tion needs to be respected’ (BrAutoA_scm3). In practical terms, this did entail 
encouraging suppliers to adopt particular approaches to the organization of work 
and quality; many of these would have driven upskilling (even if informal), safer 
working environments, and, potentially, better pay.
Discussion and conclusions
Although in some areas of the components industry there has been renewed 
emphasis on nurturing local networks of suppliers, in others, the existing indus-
trial districts model has been challenged or undermined. Our findings indicate 
that automotive majors have been able to shift much of the cost cutting bur-
den onto their suppliers, who have in turn, forced cost cutting further down the 
supply chain. This has disrupted established relationships, especially with those 
making relatively low tech components, which historically relied on proximity 
for competitive advantage. It also appears to have impacted on the monitoring 
of HR practices.
On the one hand, even in the absence of comprehensive checking of HR prac-
tices, there was close formal and informal contact within industrial districts. This 
promoted adaptability, and many suppliers proved capable of coping with rapidly 
changing external pressures, and also the development of suppliers down the sup-
ply chain. However, many of these advantages, which are traditionally conferred 
by industrial districts, are hard to quantify or accurately cost. The advantages led 
to local managers of automotive majors and tier one supplier MNEs being very 
sensitive to the needs of their local suppliers, with strong personal commitments 
to them. In contrast, HQs were less sympathetic, focusing on the readily quantifi-
able cost advantages that might be conferred from turning to lower cost suppliers 
further afield. Hence, the quality and depth of inter-organizational ties – and the 
viability of Brazilian automotive industrial districts at large – ultimately depends 
on both inter and intra organizational ties and power relations between dominant 
players in the value chain.
Successive Brazilian governments have instituted sets of policies to support 
the local automotive industry, historically by protectionism, and more recently 
by local content incentives. At the same time, policy interventions have been 
poorly coordinated, with insufficient attention being given to diversity within the 
industry, and the segmentation of supplier relations. Suppliers of basic compo-
nents may only add a small proportion of value to the vehicle, but may be effective 
providers of jobs, husband skill sets, and contribute to the overall persistence of 
an industrial district ecosystem, with close and predictable relations between 
key players. Meanwhile, it may be attractive to pay high import duties if direct 
taxes on locally based firms are also relatively high. All of this mitigates against 
the deepening of a dominant production paradigm within industrial districts, 
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characterized by commonalities in HR practices, and complementarities between 
it, and the immediate institutional environment.
While institutional mechanisms are nested at international, national, regional 
and local level within emerging and transitional settings, they will tend to be more 
loosely coupled, and this is associated with unevenly aligned regulation (Boyer 
& Hollingsworth, 1997; Lane & Wood, 2009). National government ambitions 
to strengthen the automotive sector sit poorly with uneven local planning and 
support for the development of local industrial districts. Conversely, local level 
efforts to assist suppliers may be undermined by changes in national tax and excise 
regimes. This has meant that the Brazilian automotive industry is being pulled in 
a number of different directions. Historical protectionism led to a large number of 
automotive majors and their suppliers establishing plants in Brazil. Such players 
have a first mover advantage owing to local brand awareness, a more in-depth 
knowledge of customer tastes and local market trends, and thicker ties with their 
industrial and commercial partners. However, drives to cut costs undermine such 
ties, challenging the position of more vulnerable and easily substitutable suppliers 
of basic components. Offloading of the cost-cutting agenda down the supply chain 
means that local workers for majors and first-tier suppliers may be spared the risk 
of wage cuts, particularly where unions are proactive, but they may still face threats 
to employment security where cost-cutting is associated with outsourcing. This, 
in turn, can have implications for product quality (Cooke, 2001).
This study has implications for theory and practice. At a theoretical level, the 
literature on industrial districts has tended to develop broad taxonomies based 
on the experience of the developed world. In emerging markets, where institu-
tional arrangements are weaker or more fluid, local institutional fixes may assume 
greater importance (Wood, Dibben, Stride, & Webster, 2011; Wood & Frynas, 
2006; c.f. Hancké, Rhodes, & Thatcher, 2007). In other words, if national level 
institutions do not provide the coordination and support that local players may 
require, they will devise their own institutional compromises, either through bot-
tom up institutionalization based on formal and informal understandings, and/or 
through reaching accommodations with national level institutional arrangements 
to suit local needs (c.f. Boyer, 2006). Yet, the process of institution building and 
maintenance may be a fragile one, and dependent on the persistence of dense ties 
between key actors (Thelen, 2009); any disruption to the latter may undermine 
the basis of the institutional coverage of existing industrial districts, and hence, 
ultimately leave all players worse off. If the basis of exchange relations becomes 
less uncertain or predictable, there will be a tendency to shift towards arms length 
and more abstract contracting both with workers and beyond the firm. In turn, 
workers and suppliers will have weaker incentives to build their knowledge and 
capabilities that are specifically aligned to a particular organization. Moreover, 
while more remote supply networks may cut costs it may lead to quality shortfalls 
that are difficult to detect or remedy (Wagner & Bode, 2006). As the literature 
on proximity dynamics alerts us, close intra-regional and inter-regional relations 
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down supply networks can enhance organizational performance. However, this 
article highlights how remote suppliers may be able to compete on the basis of 
extremely low costs, even if closer partners may be better at fostering innovation 
on the basis of better labour standards, productivity and organization specific 
human capital (Oerlemans & Meeus, 2005). Yet, whilst shifting to ultra-low cost 
remote suppliers about which little is known may accord a lifeline to automotive 
plants and tier 1 suppliers facing intense competitive pressures, this may lead to 
longer term costs of reduced innovation and sustainability. Of arguably greater 
importance, it may also lead to a lack of knowledge of the HRM practices of sup-
pliers, with implications for worker rights and firm reputations.
At an applied level, the study reveals the increasingly close relationship between 
how firms manage their people and how they manage their suppliers. The previous 
shift to leaner staffing within core firms led to an increasing range of functions 
being fulfilled by first-tier suppliers. In turn, this led to closely integrated rela-
tionships, centring on a shared production paradigm, tight inventories and a 
close coordination of production, often between players in close spatial proximity. 
More recently this model has begun to unwind, driven by global over-capacity 
within the automotive industry and the entry and rise of new low-cost automotive 
component suppliers in Asia. Within the industry, HR practitioners in the major 
and the first-tier suppliers have had to contend with the challenges of reconciling 
downsizing with a production paradigm that remains centred on high levels of 
responsible autonomy and mutual commitment. Although it has been possible to 
alleviate some of the negative consequences of downsizing through compensating 
workers via historically high wage levels, this may be more difficult to sustain in 
the future as competitive pressure tightens, particularly in the context of Brazil’s 
political and economic crises. External pressures can lead to the value of the 
human capabilities of suppliers lower down the chain being discounted; whilst 
the latter – and associated formal and informal HR systems – may be central to 
high-quality production, this does not mean that they are immune to external 
pressures. HR managers are in the unenviable position of having to respond to 
these challenges; there is little doubt that any solutions may be experimental and 
ad hoc, but will need to be carefully calibrated so as not to further undermine 
existing relationships and implicit understandings.
Suppliers in Brazil, and indeed, many other emerging markets in Latin America 
and Africa, are unable to compete with China on the basis of low wages; hence, 
any alternatives should centre on the revitalization of HR models that compensate 
for wage premiums with high productivity and quality. This would centre on the 
use of high levels of codetermination. Although this is already widespread in the 
automotive sector, there is always ample room to refine such systems in line with 
advances in technology, and ensuring that suppliers adhere to good employment 
practices without losing proprietary technological advantages. In the end, this 
path remains contingent on the automotive majors according more attention to 
accurately costing the worth of social networks and ties down the supply chain, 
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and associated mechanisms for ensuring that optimal ways of managing people 
are sustained.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the editor and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful 
comments. They also acknowledge the support and contributions of the broader project team 
and Advisory Board, in addition to those interviewed for the purpose of this research.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) [grant 
 number ES/K006452/1].
References
Aoki, M. (2010). Corporations in evolving diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Barros, F. V. (2015). Crise do setor automobilístico no Brasil repercute em Frankfurt. Folha de 
São Paulo. Retrieved from http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2015/09/1682684-crise-
do-setor-automobilistico-no-brasil-repercute-em-frankfurt.shtml
Bellandi, M. (1996). Innovation and change in the Marshallian industrial district. European 
Planning Studies, 4, 357–368.
Belussi F. (2015). The international resilience of Italian industrial districts/clusters (ID/C) 
between knowledge re-shoring and manufacturing off (near)-shoring. Investigaciones 
Regionales [Journal of Regional Research], 32, 89–113.
Belussi, F., & De Propris, L. (2013). They are industrial districts, but not as we know them!. In 
F. Giarratani, G. Hewings, & P. McCann (Eds.), Handbook of industry studies and economic 
geography (pp. 479–492). Cheltenham: Elgar.
Belussi, F., & Sammarra, A. (2010). Preface. In F. Belussi & A. Sammarra (Eds.), Business 
networks in clusters and industrial districts: the governance of the global value chain  
(pp. 438–440). London: Routledge.
Belussi F., & Sedita, S. (2010). Managing the fragmented value chain of global business: 
Exploitative and explorative offshoring towards emerging market economies. In T. Devinney, 
T. Pedersen, & L. Tihanyi (Eds.), The past, present and future of international business and 
management: Advances in international management (Vol. 23, pp 399–429). London: 
Emerald.
Benders, J., & Van Hootegem, G. (1999). Teams and their context: Moving the team discussion 
beyond existing dichotomies. Journal of Management Studies, 36, 609–628.
Bouba-Olga, O., Carrincazeaux, C., Coris, M., & Ferru, M. (2015). Proximity dynamics, social 
networks and innovation. Regional Studies, 49, 901–906.
Boyer, R. (2006). How do institutions cohere and change. In G. Wood & P. James (Eds.), 
Institutions and working life (pp. 13–61). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Boyer, R., & Hollingsworth, R. (1997). From national embeddedness to spatial and institutional 
nestedness. In J. Hollingsworth & R. Boyer (Eds.), Contemporary capitalism: The embeddedness 
of institutions (pp. 433–484). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
THe InTeRnATIonAL JouRnAL of HuMAn ReSouRCe MAnAGeMenT  17
Collins, R., Bechler, K., & Pires, S. (1997). Outsourcing in the automotive industry: From JIT 
to Modular Consortia. European Management Journal, 15, 498–508.
Cooke, F. L. (2001). Human resource strategy to improve organizational performance: a route 
for firms in Britain? International Journal of Management Reviews, 3, 321–339.
Cooke, F. L., Wood, G., & Horwitz, F. (2015). Multinational firms from emerging economies in 
Africa: Implications for research and practice in human resource management. International 
Journal of HRM, 26, 2653–2675.
Crouch, C., & Le Galès, P. (2004). Introduction. In C. Crouch, P. Le Galès, C. Trigilia, & 
T. H. Voelzkow (Eds.), Changing governance of local economies (pp. 1–10). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Dedrick, J., Kraemer, K. L., & Linden, G. (2009). Who profits from innovation in global value 
chains? Industrial and Corporate Change, 19, 81–116.
De Marchi, V., & Grandinetti, R. (2014). Industrial districts and the collapse of the Marshallian 
model: Looking at the Italian experience. Competition & Change, 18, 70–87.
Frigant, V. (2009). Winners and losers in the auto parts industry: Trajectories followed by the 
main First Tier Suppliers over the past decade. In M. Freyssenet (Ed.), The second automobile 
revolution (pp. 419–442). New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan.
Giannoccaro, I. (2015). Adaptive supply chains in industrial districts: A complexity science 
approach focused on learning. International Journal of Production Economics, 170, 576–589.
Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative 
research. Chicago, IL: Aldine Publishing Group.
Hameri, A. P., & Paatela, A. (2005). Supply network dynamics as a source of new business. 
International Journal of Production Economics, 98, 41–55.
Hancké, B., Rhodes, M., & Thatcher, M. (2007). Introduction: Beyond varieties of capitalism. 
In B. Hancke, M. Rhodes, & M. Thatcher (Eds.), Beyond varieties of capitalism (pp. 3–38). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hervas-Oliver, J. L. H., Gonzalez, G., Caja, P., & Sempere-Ripoll, F. (2015). Clusters and 
industrial districts: Where is the literature going? Identifying emerging sub-fields of research. 
European Planning Studies, 23, 1827–1872.
Humphrey, J. (2003). Globalization and supply chain networks: The auto industry in Brazil 
and India. Global Networks, 3, 121–141.
Humphrey, J., & Salerno, M. (1999). Globalisation and assembler–supplier relations: Brazil 
and India. Actes du Gerpisa no. 25. Retrieved from http://gerpisa.org/ancien-gerpisa/
actes/25/25-3.pdf
Humphrey, J., & Schmitz, H. (1996). The triple C approach to local industrial policy. World 
Development, 24, 1859–1877.
Lane, C., & Wood, G. (2009). Capitalist diversity and diversity within capitalism. Economy 
and Society, 38, 531–551.
Mevin, R. (2014). Distritos industriais. Blog Logística. Retrieved from http://www.bloglogistica.
com.br/mercado/distritos-industriais/
Meyer-Stamer, J. (1998). Path dependence in regional development: Persistence and change 
in three industrial clusters in Santa Catarina, Brazil. World Development, 26, 1495–1511.
Michalos, G., Makris, S., Papakostas, N., Mourtzis, D., & Chryssolouris, G. (2010). Automotive 
assembly technologies review: Challenges and outlook for a flexible and adaptive approach. 
CIRP Journal of Manufacturing Science and Technology, 2, 81–91.
Molina-Morales, F. X., & Martinez-Fernandez, M. (2006). Industrial districts: Something more 
than a neighbourhood. Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 18, 503–524.
National Confederation of Industry, Brazil (CIN). (2015). Federations and unions. Retrieved 
from http://admin.cni.org.br/portal/data/pages/FF80808121B629230121B62A6E9C0428.
htm
18  P. DIBBen eT AL.
Nepal, B., Chinnam, R. B., Petrycia, J., Brush, E., Chisholm, C., Hearn, M., & Meixner, M. 
(2007). A quality-based business model for determining non-product investment: A case 
study From a Ford automotive engine plant. Engineering Management Journal, 19, 41–56.
Oerlemans, L., & Meeus, M. (2005). Do organizational and spatial proximity impact on firm 
performance? Regional Studies, 39, 89–104.
Oliver, J. L. H., Garrigós, J. A., & Porta, J. I. D. (2008). External ties and the reduction of 
knowledge asymmetries among clusters within global value chains: The case of the ceramic 
tile district of Castellon. European Planning Studies, 16, 507–520.
Paniccia, I. (1998). One, a hundred, thousands of industrial districts. organizational variety in 
local networks of small and medium-sized enterprises. Organization Studies, 19, 667–699.
Pascoal, E. T., Candido, G. M., Ugo, I., Delamaro, M. C., & Tsukada, O. (2014). New Brazilian 
automotive policy and the increase of local auto parts content: A critical analysis of the 
automotive supply chain. Retrieved from http://gerpisa.org/en/node/2464
Pinch, S., Henry, N., Jenkins, M., & Tallman, S. (2003). From ‘industrial districts’ to ‘knowledge 
clusters’: A model of knowledge dissemination and competitive advantage in industrial 
agglomerations. Journal of Economic Geography, 3, 373–388.
Pla-Barber, J., & Puig, F. (2009). Is the influence of the industrial district on international 
activities being eroded by globalization?. International Business Review, 18, 435–445.
Rabellotti, R., & Schmitz, H. (1999). The internal heterogeneity of industrial districts in Italy, 
Brazil and Mexico. Regional Studies, 33, 97–108.
Scavarda, L. F. R., & Hamacher, S. (2001). Evolução da cadeia de suprimentos da indústria 
automobilística no Brasil [Evolution of supply chains in the automotive industry in Brazil]. 
Revista de Administração Contemporânea, 5, 201–219.
Surana, A., Kumara, S., Greaves, M., & Raghavan, U. N. (2005). Supply-chain networks: A 
complex adaptive systems perspective. International Journal of Production Research, 43, 
4235–4265.
Thelen, K. (2009). Institutional change in advanced political economies. British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 47, 471–498.
Versiani, I. (2015). Brazilian automotive industry cuts 38,700 jobs in first half of 2015. 
Folha de Sao Paulo. Retrieved from http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/internacional/en/
business/2015/08/1668105-brazilian-automotive-industry-cuts-38700-jobs-in-first-half-
of-2015.shtml
Vom Hofe, R., & Chen, K. (2006). Whither or not industrial cluster: Conclusions or confusions. 
The Industrial Geographer, 4, 2–28.
Wagner, S. M., & Bode, C. (2006). An empirical investigation into supply chain vulnerability. 
Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 12, 301–312.
Wood, G., Dibben, P., Stride, C., & Webster, E. (2011). HRM in Mozambique: Homogenization, 
path dependence or segmented business system? Journal of World Business, 46, 31–41.
Wood, G., & Frynas, G. (2006). The institutional basis of economic failure: anatomy of the 
segmented business system. Socio-Economic Review, 4, 239–277.
Xanthopoulos, A., Vlachos, D., & Iakovou, E. (2012). Optimal newsvendor policies for 
dual-sourcing supply chains: A disruption risk management framework. Computers and 
Operations Research, 39, 350–357.
